NORTH KOREA

A year after the historic North-South Korea Summit of 13 June 2000

"the North Korean regime can be satisfied: all sorts of non-conditional help have flown into the country and its rulers have not backed down one inch. The famine has not abated, the number of refugees fleeing to China has not diminished and public executions are still common practice."

This issue of HRWF press service offers to its readers the article by Pierre Rigoulot on the human rights abuses in North Korea and the implications for the EU policies towards the country. On 31 May 2001, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the outcome of the Council and Commission mission to Korea. The text of the resolution is included in this issue.

Pierre Rigoulot is the author of "Les aquariums de Pyongyang par Kang Chol-Hwan" (Editions Robert Laffont), president of the Committee for Help of the People of North Korea and editor-in-chief of La lettre de Core.

27 June 2001

FLASH NEWS

China deported forcibly at least 6000 North Korean defectors to North Korea

The world refugees survey 2001 released by USCR (US Committee for Refugees www.refugees.org) reported that at least 6000 North Korean defectors were deported forcibly to North Korea last year. It added that up to 10 % of North Korean population that had died of food shortage since the mid 1990s. According to the world refugees survey 2001 by USCR, deported defectors to North Korea have increased rapidly since January 1999 when the Chinese government claimed that they were not refugees but "food migrants".

A year later

By Pierre Rigoulot

Letter of Korea no 21 ( June 2001)/ HRWF International Secretariat (27.06.2001) - Website: http://www.hrwf.net - Email: info@hrwf.net - On June 13th 2000, the world community had the privilege of attending a strange premire, the show being the encounter of the leaders of both Koreas. To say that this summit raised lots of hopes would be a euphemism: rapprochement reconciliation reunification in a very near future, the event was truly marvellous. As the result of an open and friendly attitude from the South, - the cutely called "sunshine policy" -, that summit was to mark the beginning of high level negotiations between the "enemy brothers". Tension was going to give way to trust, cooperation was to start immediately, families were to be reunited and would meet again, and the enigmatic Kim Jong Il would soon return the favour the tenacious maker of dtente, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, (he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts), was doing him.

Foreign investors were rejoicing at the prospect, too. They would soon be able to employ cheap North Korean labour, provided international banks lent a hand to the operation.

Last but not least, so as not to miss the train and even though the French had some reservations about security and human rights, several European leaders did not hesitate, - somewhat haphazardly and without any concessions from the other side -, to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

A year has passed and the whole thing has gone down the drain. The minister level discussions between North and South Korea have stopped. The three family reunions (and they were limited and very closely monitored) are but a far away memory. South Korean and other foreign investors are still waiting for guarantees from the North. Even worse, one of the rare South Korean operations in the North, - the Kumgang Tourist Complex -, is on the blink: Hyundai has lost millions and millions of dollars in the deal and has been desperately trying to renegotiate its contract with the North.

But the North Korean regime can be satisfied: all sorts of non-conditional help have flown into the country and its rulers have not backed down one inch. The famine has not abated, the number of refugees fleeing to China has not diminished and public executions are still common practice. Not to mention the ongoing sale of missiles to Middle East countries and the maintenance of an army that is more than one million men strong.

And lets not forget Kim Jong Ils visit to Seoul: everybodys still waiting for it to happen, even though it was part of the plan.

Plus the fact that the Pyong Yang leaders have succeeded in convincing a good number of diplomats and some public opinions that the cooling off between North and South Korea is the result of the "hard-ball" policy initiated by the United States against them. Forgotten is the fact, - even in Seoul where some high level civil servants are now prone to privately attacking the "haughty cowboys" of the Bush administration -, that US diplomats didnt start having second thoughts about Kim Jong Il and the necessity of reopening a round of negotiations with him until long after the North Koreans had unilaterally slowed down on the family reunions and begun threatening to end all negotiations with the South if Seoul did not disavow a very mild Official Report on North Korean Defence, in which it was stated that militarily speaking, the North was still the number one threat to the South.

Unfortunately, the leaders of the EU seem to believe the North Korean version about the origin of the cooling off between North and South. Their latest trip to Pyongyang was indeed hailed as a means to restore a process that was if not openly hindered by the US, at least not sufficiently encouraged by the Bush administration. They now think that their policy is a "necessary complement" to the American diplomacy in the area. How sweet!

Nevertheless, these discussions between the EU and the leaders of North Korea will not change the situation much. Europe can indeed invite half a dozen North Korean bureaucrats to attend a few conferences on human rights: this will not make Pyongyang dismantle its concentration camps.

This attitude on the part of the EU leaders does show how little they know about the true nature of the North Korean regime. Aptly qualified as "missionary" by Fran?ois Godement in an article published by Libration on May 22nd , their innocent approach is alas shared by the South Korean government of today.

One must say and repeat both to the EU and South Korean leaders that Kim Jong Il will never be a human rights advocate. One must say and repeat that reconciling the archeo-stalinist regime of Pyongyang with democracies, wherever they be, and that reunifying the Korean peninsula will not happen until the Communist state collapses, as it did in Germany. One should also not forget that the North has been getting financial and diplomatic advantages for at least 25 years by threatening to destabilize East Asia or launching seduction campaigns such as the meeting of June 2000. Alternating smiles and threats has only one purpose: maintaining the regime in place.

This does not mean nothing has changed in North Korea and our diplomats would do well to be aware of it: the Pyongyang regime is beginning to fall apart. Thousands and thousands of refugees vote against it "with their feet". They go to China not only to get some food, but also to find a little more freedom. Very often, they do come back to North Korea to help their families, and thus bring back something to eat and news that discredit the official propaganda about the "socialist paradise" in which they are said to live. Graffiti against Kim Jong Il are beginning to appear on the walls. An increasing number of North Koreans listen to foreign-based radio stations. The number of North Koreans who made it to Seoul has never been so high.

These first signs of resistance must be encouraged and supported. The North Koreans must know that Europe is indeed in favour of their hopes for democracy and a more dignified way of life. Help of a new type must be provided, such as soap, medicine and food. And news. France would do well to have a news program in Korean on its RFI (Radio France International) channel.

Before establishing relations, diplomatic or otherwise, with North Korea, the various nations of the world should make it clear they want proof that human rights are respected and security in the area is not threatened.

Then and only then can we hope to see 22 million North Koreans finally have a better life, North and South be reunited and one of the most dangerous tension zones in the world be pacified.

Outcome of the Council and Commission mission to Korea

B5-0398, 400, 401, 402, 403 and 404/2001

European Parliament resolution on the outcome of the Council and Commission mission to Korea adopted on 31 May 2001

The European Parliament,

C recalling its resolutions of 23 March 1999 and 17 January 2001 on EU-DPRK relations following the visits of its ad hoc delegation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in December 1998 and November 2000,

C having regard to the Declaration for Peace on the Korean peninsula issued at the third Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM 3) in Seoul in October 2000,

A. whereas the Stockholm European Council of 23/24 March 2001 agreed to enhance the role of the EU in support of peace, security and freedom on the Korean peninsula,

B. whereas the EU troika, led by the Council President and accompanied by the CFSP High Representative and Commissioner Patten, visited the DPRK for the first time and met with President Kim Jong-Il on 3 May 2001,

C. expressing disappointment, however, at the fact that no Members of the European Parliament were able to travel with the EU delegation,

D. whereas these talks aimed at contributing to a revival of the process of reconciliation between the North and South of the divided peninsula,

E. whereas the majority of EU Member States have established diplomatic relations with the DPRK and the Commission has announced, following consultations with the Member States, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK,

F. expressing concern at the fact that exports of military technology and missiles by the DPRK are continuing,

G. whereas the human rights situation in the DPRK continues to be precarious and there is a lack of progress towards establishing the rule of law,

H. whereas the peninsula is experiencing its second drought season in a row, adding to the agricultural problems of the DPRK caused by inappropriate policies, and threatening its population once again with starvation,

1. Strongly supports the inter-Korean reconciliation process and the EU and international efforts to promote peace and maintain stability on the Korean peninsula;

2. Welcomes President Kim Dae Jung's role and efforts in the search for peace and stability in the North East Asia region;

3. Welcomes the EU troika's visit, aimed at making a positive contribution to peace in the region;

4. Notes President Kim Jong-Il's confirmation that a moratorium on medium-range missile testing will continue at least until 2003 but considers that the North Korean government should be judged on its behaviour;

5. Welcomes the Commission's announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK and believes that this will facilitate the EU's efforts in support of the process of reconciliation on the Korean peninsula initiated last year between the two Korean republics and reiterates its attachment to the undertakings entered into in June 2000 during the summit between the two Korean heads of State;

6. Invites the Council and the Commission to expand EU assistance in a measured way linked to North Korea's response to international concerns with regard to progress on inter-Korean reconciliation, non-proliferation issues, respect for human rights and political and economic structural reforms and to coordinate their policies with the other major actors of the international community in order to enhance the dialogue with the DPRK;

7. Welcomes the formal arrangements made for dialogue between the European Union and the DPRK on human rights issues and signals that it will henceforth pay particular attention as regards concrete results achieved in this field;

8. Invites the Commission to continue humanitarian assistance, insists that the non-governmental organisations and international agencies distributing humanitarian aid in the DPRK should be given greater freedom of movement and believes that easier access to the DPRK, e.g. for journalists and international observers, would increase the world's public awareness of the humanitarian crisis;

9. Hopes that the European Union will also provide support for the development of non-nuclear energy in the Korean peninsula;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the President, government and parliament of the Republic of Korea and the President, government and parliament of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.